

**SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION  
& HISTORY OF SCIENCE**

**FACULTY OF ARTS**



**UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS**

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# PHIL 2322

## Moral Philosophy

Module leader: Dr Daniel Elstein

2017-18

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**Level: 2**

**Semester Taught: 1**

**Credits: 20**

**Module Aims & Objectives:**

The objectives of this module are that after completing it students should be able to:

1. Show a good grasp of central issues, arguments, and theories in normative ethics and give clear and accurate exposition of leading philosophical treatments of such;
2. Show understanding of how these issues, arguments, and theories relate to one another;
3. Demonstrate the capacity to analyse arguments critically and develop their own position in relation to these issues.

**Teaching Methods:**

- 18 one hour lectures
- 9 one hour seminars

You can view all of your lecture and seminar times and locations on your personal timetable, which can be accessed via the Student Portal. **You should check your timetable regularly throughout the term in case of any location changes.**

**Required Materials:**

You are not required to purchase any materials, since all readings will be available online.

**Attendance:**

Attendance at lectures and seminars for this module is compulsory. Please see the **School Undergraduate Handbook** (available in the VLE) for full details of School regulations on attendance

**Private Study:**

This is a 20 credit level 2 module with a total allocation of 200 study hours. In addition to the timetabled teaching hours, the 173 hours of private study time should include:

- Seminar preparation: 120 hours
- Revision notes: 13 hours
- Examination preparation: 40 hours

You should pace the progress of your study, by starting independent library searching and reading *early* in the semester. Even if the lecture relevant to your choice of essay title has yet to be delivered, make sure that you have begun your research early, in order to ensure that you are not short of books later on, when library resources are in peak demand.

## Assessment:

Assessment is by:

- one 2000 word essay (50%)
- two-hour exam (50%)

Please see the **School Undergraduate Handbook** (available in the VLE) for full details of School assessment procedures including essay presentation and submission, word limits, deadlines, extension requests, examinations and resits. Guidelines on referencing and plagiarism can also be found in the Handbook.

Resits will be assessed by the same methodology as the first attempt.

### Essay Titles

You are not allowed to submit the same work twice. You must ensure that your essay does not overlap extensively with work submitted for your dissertation, or for other modules within your subject or in related subjects.

Essay titles will be released at least four weeks before the essay deadline.

You may submit (to your seminar leader) an up to 500 word essay plan for feedback before the essay. Do so at least a week before the deadline to guarantee a timely response.

### Exams

The exam will be two hours long. In that time you will have to answer two essay questions (from a longer list). The exam will be closed book.

### Word Limit

The word limit for the essay is 2000 words.

There is no fixed penalty for exceeding word limits, but work will not be read beyond the point at which the word count was exceeded, and the work will be marked accordingly. You should note that this may mean that your work will be marked as though it lacked a conclusion.

Each component of assessment in this module must be attempted. If you do not attempt one of the components you will be required to re-sit the component in order to pass the module.

## Feedback Arrangements:

You will receive feedback on your assessments within three weeks.

Feedback for the essay will be via Turnitin.

Feedback for the exam will be via a document posted in Minerva, with feedback found by searching for your student number.

## Module Outline and Reading List:

Use the bibliography contained in this course document to assist in your reading for this module and, particularly, for your assessment preparation. It is not a comprehensive list, and certainly not a substitute for your own independent research amongst the library holdings and online journals.

This outline comes in two sections:

- a quick reference guide for seminar readings and questions
- a longer outline of the lecture schedule, including further readings for the various lecture topics, and indicating which seminar readings are linked to particular lectures

### Seminar readings quick reference guide:

#### Week 2 seminar – The good life:

- Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Appendix I: What makes someone's life go best

Questions: Is there any tension between morality and self-interest, or is the best life a moral one? Must a good life have any connection with what a person subjectively values? What kind of connection?

#### Week 3 seminar - :

- Susan Wolf, Moral saints. *The Journal of Philosophy* 79. 419-439
- John Stuart Mill. *Utilitarianism*. Chapter 2: What Utilitarianism Is (from Section 19)
- Neera Badhwar Kapur, Consequentialism and Friendship. *Ethics* 101. 483-504

Questions: Is the idea of a moral saint an attractive, or coherent, ideal? Can we make sense of the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons? What does it mean to say that something is good, 'all things considered'?

Does morality demand that we treat everyone equally? Or are we permitted – perhaps even required – to prefer the good of people with whom we have particular relationships?

#### Week 4 seminar – Why should we care about others? (Egoism and Constructivism):

- Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* Chapter 7: The appeal to full relativity pp.137-149
- Sharon Street, Coming to Terms with Contingency in *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy*, edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer pp.40-60

Questions: What is self-interest? Is it the source of all reasons for action? Do I have ever have an obligation to others, or only to myself?

Is morality constructed from a subjective point of view? If so, is there anything *essentially* embedded in this perspective, or is everything potentially revisable?

#### Week 5 seminar – Egalitarianism

- Amartya Sen, Equality of what? *Tanner Lectures*

- Derek Parfit, 'Equality and Priority,' *Ratio* 10 (1997): 202-221

Questions: Should egalitarians be concerned primarily with equality in what people have, how they relate to one another, or something else? What is the point of equality?  
Is equality really valuable in itself, and if not, what is left of egalitarianism?

#### No seminar (or lectures) in Week 6

#### Week 7 seminar – Population ethics

- Simon Caney, Climate change and the future: Discounting for time, wealth, and risk. *Journal of Social Philosophy* 40 (2). 163-186
- Gregory Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11. 93-112

Questions: Does it make sense for there to be duties to people who do not (yet) exist? What is it to discount the future, and what reasons are there for or against doing so? How should we approach the issue of 'overpopulation'?

Can we think of our duties to future generations in terms of not harming or benefiting future individuals? How else could we think of those duties?

#### Week 8 seminar – Commensurability and aggregation

- John Taurek, Should the numbers count?, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6. 293-316
- Derek Parfit, Innumerate Ethics, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 7. 285-301
- Alastair Norcross, Comparing harms: Headaches and human lives. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 26. 135-167

Questions: Should we always choose the biggest group if we cannot save everyone? Or decide randomly? Should the overall size of the benefit have any influence on our decision?

Can it ever be right to prioritise minor harms and benefits over major ones? Is there any non-arbitrary place to set a threshold between different kinds of harm?

#### Week 9 seminar – Moral luck

- Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 50. 115-151
- P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, *Freedom and Resentment and other Essays*

Questions: What kind of control do we need to exercise to be responsible for the outcomes of our actions? Does that distinguish our intentions from the consequences of our actions? Is the existence of moral luck morally objectionable?

Are our actions morally evaluable if they are determined by external forces? What reasons do we have for praising and blaming people in general, and do those reasons allow for moral luck?

Week 10 seminar – The Trolley Problem

- Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, *Oxford Review* 5: 5-15
- Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, *The Yale Law Journal* 94. 1395-1415

Questions: Does it make a moral difference whether I am actively involved in bringing about a consequence? What, in fact, does it mean to be ‘actively’ involved? Can we make a morally relevant distinction between consequences that I intend, and those that I merely foresee? Is there a satisfactory solution to the Trolley Problem? What should we even look for in a solution?

Week 11 seminar – Character

- Aristotle: *Nichomachean Ethics* II.5-II.7
- Candace Upton, The Structure of Character. *The Journal of Ethics* 13. 175-93
- Neil Levy, Enhancing authenticity. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 28(3), 308-318

Questions: Do you have a ‘character’? Can we make sense of virtue ethics if we abandon the assumptions of stability, globalism, or both?

Is it a good thing to be authentic? Is authenticity best understood in subjective terms, or does the authentic life have to be engaged with some objective values? Could I become more authentic by using artificial means?

**Lecture schedule outline:**

Week 1:

Lecture 1: The good life (and module introduction)

Some people, particularly Aristotle, have thought that there is no tension between what is moral, and the good life for human beings. But most contemporary views of the good life distinguish between what is good for the person whose life it is (self interest, well-being) and what is morally right. Well-being is also of interest to morality because most moral views involve some role for the well-being of others. If we are to include considerations of others’ good in our decisions, we need to know what is good for them.

**Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 2):**

- Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Appendix I: What makes someone’s life go best

**Further Reading:**

- Extract (The Experience Machine) from Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*
- Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*
- Sara Ahmed *Killing joy: Feminism and the history of happiness*
- Valerie Tiberius, Well-being: Psychological research for philosophers. *Philosophy Compass* 1(5). 493-505
- Ben Bradley *Well-being and Death*
- Helen Baber, ‘Adaptive preference’. *Social Theory and Practice*. 33(1).

Questions: Is there any tension between morality and self-interest, or is the best life a moral one? Must a good life have any connection with what a person subjectively values? What kind of connection?

### Week 2:

#### Lecture 2: The good life (continued)

#### Lecture 3: Moral, and other, reasons

Having considered the relationship between a person's moral reasons and their personal well-being, we now consider the idea of partiality. It is at least somewhat intuitive that acting morally means acting 'for the best'. Yet if the best is understood in an impersonal sense, this leaves little or no room for other sources of value in our lives: those that make our lives worth living. This lecture considers the view held by Wolf, Williams and others that there is an opposition between our 'moral' reasons for action, and other reasons. It also discusses whether things are only good – when they are – in some respect, or whether there can be an 'all things considered' best or good.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 3):**

- Susan Wolf, Moral saints. *The Journal of Philosophy* 79. 419-439

#### **Further Reading:**

- Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right and the Good. *The Journal of Philosophy* 94. 273-298
- Joseph Raz, *Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action*
- Ruth Chang, All things considered. *Philosophical Perspectives* 18. 1-22

Questions: Is the idea of a moral saint an attractive, or coherent, ideal? Can we make sense of the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons? What does it mean to say that something is good, 'all things considered'?

### Week 3:

#### Lecture 4: Can morality be partial?

As well as its apparent conflicts with other sources of good in our lives, the view that morality demands 'the best' in some impersonal sense conflicts with common sense moral permissions to show some preference to particular individuals. We consider both pragmatic nods to partiality – as outlined by utilitarians like Mill and Sidgwick – and deeper theoretical commitments to the view that partiality is permitted, and perhaps even demanded.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 3):**

- John Stuart Mill. *Utilitarianism*. Chapter 2: What Utilitarianism Is (from Section 19)
- Neera Badhwar Kapur, Consequentialism and Friendship. *Ethics* 101. 483-504

#### **Further Reading:**

- Elizabeth Ashford, Utilitarianism, Integrity and Partiality, *Journal of Philosophy* 97. 421-439
- Susan Wolf, Morality and Partiality *Philosophical Perspectives* 6. 243-259
- Lisa Cassidy, Starving children in Africa: Who cares?. *Journal of International Women's Studies* 7. 84-96

Questions: Does morality demand that we treat everyone equally? Or are we permitted – perhaps even required – to prefer the good of people with whom we have particular relationships?

*Why should we care about others?*

#### Lecture 5 – Egoism

Both ethical and psychological egoism are regarded by many philosophers as obviously mistaken; but they are also widely held among non-philosophers. This lecture considers both views in a sympathetic light, as well as outlining the strongest responses to them.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 4):**

- Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* Chapter 7: The appeal to full relativity pp.137-149

#### **Further Reading:**

- Joel Feinberg, Psychological Egoism in Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau, *Reason and Responsibility*
- Keith Burgess-Jackson, Taking egoism seriously. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 16. 529-542
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason. *Ethics* 123. 9-31

Questions: What is self-interest? Is it the source of all reasons for action? Do I have ever have an obligation to others, or only to myself?

### Week 4

#### Lecture 6 – Constructivism(s)

Building on our discussion of egoism, we move onto the more sophisticated view of ethical constructivism. We consider the difference between two kinds of constructivism: the Kantian constructivism of Christine Korsgaard, which insists that although morality is constructed, it has a necessary starting point, and the more radical Humean view championed by Sharon Street.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 4):**

- Sharon Street, Coming to Terms with Contingency in *Constructivism in Practical Philosophy*, edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer pp.40-60

#### **Further Reading:**

- Christine Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (Particularly Lecture III).
- Onora O'Neill, Constructivism vs contractualism *Ratio* 16. 319-331
- Philippa Foot, Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives *Philosophical Review* 81. 305-316

Questions: Is morality constructed from a subjective point of view? If so, is there anything *essentially* embedded in this perspective, or is everything potentially revisable?

#### Lecture 7 – Distributive egalitarianism

We can contrast the idea of maximising benefit with claims of equality. This lecture begins with Mill's claim that utilitarianism embodies equality by counting every person as one and nobody as more than

one. We then consider more substantive theories of equality in response to this idea, considering distributive views (including some discussion of the 'currency' of justice – what egalitarians are trying to equalise), and the relational egalitarianism produced in response to such views.

### Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 5)

- Amartya Sen, Equality of what? *Tanner Lectures*

### Further Reading:

- G.A. Cohen, On the currency of egalitarian justice *Ethics* 99. 906-944
- Elizabeth Anderson, What is the point of equality? *Ethics* 109, 287-337
- Jonathan Wolff, Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 27, 97-122

## Week 5

### Lecture 8 – Equality, Priority, Sufficiency

This lecture develops the themes of the previous one by considering the disagreement concerning equality, priority and sufficiency. Egalitarians face the challenge of saying how and why equality itself can be valuable, in the face of the levelling down objection. Prioritarians claim that benefits to the worse off matter more than benefits to the better off, which allows for a way of being more egalitarian than utilitarianism without caring about equality itself. Sufficiencyarians think that distributive justice does not demand equality, requiring only that everyone is sufficiently well off.

### Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 5)

- Derek Parfit, 'Equality and Priority,' *Ratio* 10 (1997): 202-221

### Further Reading:

- Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, 'Why it Matters that Some are Worse Off than Others: An Argument against the Priority View', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 37 (2009): 171–99
- Harry Frankfurt: Equality as a moral ideal, *Ethics* 98. 21-43
- Liam Shields, The Prospects for Sufficiencyarianism, *Utilitas* 24. 101-117
- Larry Temkin, *Inequality*

Questions: Should egalitarians be concerned primarily with equality in what people have, how they relate to one another, or something else? What is the point of equality? Is equality really valuable in itself, and if not, what is left of egalitarianism?

### Lecture 9 – Population ethics

Many contemporary moral theories primarily, or solely, address our responsibilities to individuals with whom we temporally co-exist; yet in some cases, most people who will be affected by our actions do not yet exist. This lecture outlines two problems of obligations to people who do not currently exist. First, we will consider the grounds of obligations to people who *will* exist, whatever we do. We also consider the idea of 'overpopulation', and what kinds of policies are justified in the name of reducing population size for the sake of the environment.

### Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 7):

- Simon Caney, Climate change and the future: Discounting for time, wealth, and risk. *Journal of Social Philosophy* 40 (2). 163-186

**Further Reading:**

- John Broome, Discounting the Future, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 23. 128-156
- Lukas Meyer and Dominic Roser, Enough for the Future in *Intergenerational Justice*, Axel Gosseries and Lukas H. Meyer (eds.), 219–248.
- Garrett Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics

Questions: Does it make sense for there to be duties to people who do not (yet) exist? What is it to discount the future, and what reasons are there for or against doing so? How should we approach the issue of 'overpopulation'?

*Week 6 – No lectures or seminars*

*Week 7*

Lecture 10 – Population ethics continued

We will then consider the possibility of obligations to people who only might exist, depending on our actions, including the infamous non-identity problem.

**Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 7):**

- Gregory Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11. 93-112

**Further Reading:**

- Melinda Roberts, What Is the Wrong of Wrongful Disability? From Chance to Choice to Harms to Persons, *Law and Philosophy*, 28: 1–57.
- Jan Narveson, "Utilitarianism and New Generations". *Mind* 76. 62-72
- Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Chapter 16

Questions: Can we think of our duties to future generations in terms of not harming or benefiting future individuals? How else could we think of those duties?

Lecture 11 – Commensurability of persons

Even if we are permitted to prefer certain people over others, some ethical decisions involve choosing between people for whom there are no such decisive factors. This lecture compares two ways of thinking about 'the problem of numbers': Parfit's maximalist view, and Taurek's non-aggregative view. We will also introduce Rawls' 'separateness of persons' objection to utilitarianism.

**Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 8):**

- John Taurek, Should the numbers count?, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6. 293-316
- Derek Parfit, Innumerate Ethics, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 7. 285-301

**Further Reading:**

- Katharina Rasmussen, Should the probabilities count? *Philosophical Studies* 159. 205-218
- John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Section 30, Classical Utilitarianism, Impartiality and Benevolence

Questions: Should we always choose the biggest group if we cannot save everyone? Or decide randomly? Should the overall size of the benefit have any influence on our decision?

### Week 8

#### Lecture 12 - Significant and insignificant costs

If one reason to prefer the greater number is that this produces the greater good, then the same way of thinking might be used to argue that we should aggregate gains interpersonally. This will sometimes lead us to prefer helping many people with small problems (such as headaches) over fewer people with larger problems. This lecture considers Norcross' response to the separateness of persons objection, as well as a key attempt by T.M. Scanlon to set a limit on aggregation, by appeal to inter-subjective justification.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 8):**

- Alastair Norcross, Comparing harms: Headaches and human lives. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 26. 135-167

#### **Further Reading:**

- T.M. Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*. Chapter 4: Wrongness and reasons
- Alex Voorhoeve, How should we aggregate competing claims? *Ethics* 125. 64-87
- Iwao Hirose, Aggregation and the separateness of persons. *Utilitas* 25. 182-205

Questions: Can it ever be right to prioritise minor harms and benefits over major ones? Is there any non-arbitrary place to set a threshold between different kinds of harm?

#### Lecture 13 – Moral luck

The actual consequences of our actions are largely out of our control; but once we start down this line of thought, we can observe that very few things – including the will – are entirely free of external influence. This lecture introduces the problem of moral luck, explaining the different kinds, and considers reasons for and against allowing moral luck.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 9):**

- Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 50. 115-151

#### **Further Reading:**

- David Enoch, Moral Luck and the Law, *Philosophy Compass* 5. 42-54
- Nathan Hanna, Moral Luck Defended, *Nous* 48. 683-698

Questions: What kind of control do we need to exercise to be responsible for the outcomes of our actions? Does that distinguish our intentions from the consequences of our actions? Is the existence of moral luck morally objectionable?

### Week 9

#### Lecture 14 – Luck, blame and moral responsibility

Moral luck threatens to undermine moral responsibility altogether, and make our decisions to praise and blame people seem arbitrary. In this lecture we will think about what is really involved in praising and blaming, with the aim of seeing how blame connects with responsibility and luck.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 9):**

- P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, *Freedom and Resentment and other Essays*

#### **Further Reading:**

- Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and moral responsibility, *Ethics* 97. 374-386
- Michael Cholbi, Luck, blame and desert, *Philosophical Studies* 169. 313-332
- Michelle Mason, Blame: Taking it Seriously, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 83. 473-481

Questions: Are our actions morally evaluable if they are determined by external forces? What reasons do we have for praising and blaming people in general, and do those reasons allow for moral luck?

#### Lecture 15 – The Trolley Problem

In this lecture and the next we will discuss the famous ‘Trolley Problem’, which challenges us to make sense of our moral judgements about certain life and death cases. It is tempting to think that the right way to come up with an ethical theory is by seeing how we can best account for our intuitive judgements about cases. The Trolley Problem poses a challenge to our best attempts to apply this method. Along the way we shall consider the idea that there is a morally significant difference between harming and allowing harm, and/or between harm that is intended and harm that is merely a foreseen consequence of one’s actions.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 10):**

- Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, *Oxford Review* 5: 5-15
- Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, *The Yale Law Journal* 94. 1395-1415

#### **Further Reading:**

- Jonathan Bennett, Whatever the consequences. *Analysis* 26. 83-102
- Warren Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 18. 334-351
- Frances Kamm, The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not Intend the Means to His End, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 74: 21-39
- S. Matthew Liao, The Loop Case and Kamm’s Doctrine of Triple Effect, *Philosophical Studies* 146. 223-231
- Michael Otsuka, Double Effect, Triple Effect, and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases, *Utilitas* 20. 92-110

Questions: Does it make a moral difference whether I am actively involved in bringing about a consequence? What, in fact, does it mean to be ‘actively’ involved? Can we make a morally relevant

distinction between consequences that I intend, and those that I merely foresee? Is there a satisfactory solution to the Trolley Problem? What should we even look for in a solution?

### Week 10

#### Lecture 16 – The Trolley Problem continued

#### *Character*

#### Lecture 17 – The nature of character

Virtue ethical views rely fundamentally on the idea of character. This invites the question of what exactly constitutes our character. This lecture first outlines the Aristotelian view of character and how it grounds the virtue ethical approach, and then considers some challenges both to the idea of our having a *stable* character, and to the claim that we can meaningfully describe character traits in a *global*, rather than situation-specific, way.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 11):**

- Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* II.5-II.7
- Candace Upton, The Structure of Character. *The Journal of Ethics* 13. 175-93

#### **Further Reading:**

- John Doris, Persons, situations and virtue ethics. *Nous* 34. 504-30
- Julia Annas, Comments on John Doris' *Lack of Character*. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71. 636-42
- Galen Strawson, Against Narrativity. *Ratio* 17. 428-452

Questions: Do you have a 'character'? Can we make sense of virtue ethics if we abandon the assumptions of stability, globalism, or both?

### Week 11

#### Lecture 18 – Authenticity

Closely related to the idea of character is the idea of being *true* to that character, or authenticity. Linking back to Week 1, authenticity is seen by many as a key ingredient of a good life; more generally, it is sometimes seen as a *moral* flaw to fail to be authentic. This final lecture engages with two understandings of authenticity. Perhaps the more common understanding is a subjective one, where authenticity is related in some sense to personal values of some kind. However, we will also consider a criticism of this view from Taylor, who argues that authenticity should be understood in more objective terms.

#### **Seminar Reading (for seminar in Week 11):**

- Neil Levy, Enhancing authenticity. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 28(3), 308-318

#### **Further Reading:**

- Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*
- Harry Frankfurt: Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. *Journal of Philosophy*. 68 5-20
- Simon Feldman *Against Authenticity: Why You Shouldn't be Yourself*
- Carl Elliott, *Better than well: American medicine meets the American Dream*

Questions: Is it a good thing to be authentic? Is authenticity best understood in subjective terms, or does the authentic life have to be engaged with some objective values? Could I become more authentic by using artificial means?

### **Getting Help:**

Office hours and other one to one support are for the purpose of supporting your learning, not recapping class content. Staff will not be able to provide one to one support with material already covered in class (such as lecture or tutorial content, revision advice, or example assessments) if you were absent without reason. If you are declined help because of absence, but you have ongoing reasons for absence, you should contact the Director of Undergraduate Studies. Ensure all absences are explained using the Absence Request system on the Portal, and remember that the Pastoral Support Officer, Jonny Ackroyd, is available to provide support for students with ongoing issues regarding attendance.

### Key Documents

Please ensure that you read and familiarize yourself with the following important documents, all available in the VLE:

- **School of Philosophy, Religion & History of Science Undergraduate Student Handbook**
- **School Code of Practice on Assessment**

### Module Leader

If you have queries not covered in the above key documents or in this Module Handbook, please contact the Module Leader during his office hours or by email. Since the teaching is divided between the module leader (Dr. Daniel Elstein) and Dr. Benjamin Davies, it is best to direct questions about lecture content to the relevant lecturer, though either is happy to answer questions about the content of the module. Questions about the running of the module should still be directed to the module leader.

### Student Staff Forum

You should always contact the Module Leader in the first instance about any problems which arise in relation to a module. Any unresolved concerns about a module can be directed to the Course Representative with responsibility for the module. Course Representatives are students who have successfully applied sit on the Student Staff Forum (SSF), to represent a particular programme, and a group of modules, and relay module level concerns to the SSF. Concerns about your programme of study or the School in general can also be directed to the relevant Course Representative. You can find out who your Course Representatives are, and how to contact them, by checking the Portal under the 'My Studies' tab in the top left of the screen.

If you are interested in becoming a Course Representative in the next academic year, please look out for details of the application process which will be publicized towards the end of Semester 2. The School values student input very highly.

## Recording of Teaching Sessions:

As part of your study on this module lectures will be recorded by the University. This recording is being conducted in accordance with the University's Policy on Audio or Video Recording for Educational Purposes (see [https://www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/documents/audio\\_visual\\_policy.pdf](https://www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/documents/audio_visual_policy.pdf)). Please read the Policy for further background information relating to your rights. The purpose of the recording is to support your study at the University. It will be accessible by students enrolled on the module through the University VLE.

In accordance with the University's Policy on Intellectual Property Rights (see [http://www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/documents/ipr\\_policy.pdf](http://www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/documents/ipr_policy.pdf)) in general where staff or students make a recording, all rights in that recording (including rights in the sounds made) will belong to the University. The University seeks to respect student and staff rights to be acknowledged as authors and performers. Otherwise, to the extent allowed under the general law, any individual interests in the recordings are waived, allowing the University to act in effect as a custodian, to maximise educational objectives in the general interest of all. If you have any concerns relating to the recording please contact the individual leading the educational activity, or the module leader. If you wish to opt-out of being recorded or wish to request that your contribution be edited please contact the individual leading the activity or the module leader in advance of the session (for opt-outs) or immediately after the session (for requests for edits). Please note that you may not opt out of recordings which form part of the assessment process on the module.

You may not record the above activities yourself without obtaining the consent of the individual leading the activity, unless you have permission from Disabled Students' Assessment and Support.